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ELIZABETH TAYLOR'S VAN GOGH:
AN ALTERNATIVE ROUTE TO RESTITUTION
OF HOLOCAUST ART?
Stephen K. Urice*
1. INTRODUCTION
Between 1933 and 1945, the Third Reich stole or otherwise
wrongfully appropriated cultural property from private and public
collections across Europe in a quantity and quality unprecedented
in human history.' As part of a genocide of unparalleled scale,
they also murdered (or forced into exile) many owners of that
property. Thus, at the end of World War II, most of those best
positioned to establish claims for restitution of their stolen
property were unlikely to have survived. For those who did
survive, or for their heirs, the practicalities of locating property
and compiling evidence to support a claim for restitution were
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. I
express appreciation to colleagues and friends who discussed ideas presented in,
or read drafts of, this paper, including David Abraham, Andrew Lee Adler,
Ricardo Bascuas, Scott Cohen, Donna Coker, Mary Coombs, Mary Doyle,
Jennifer Kreder, William Krisel, Milton Hirsch, Stephen J. Knerly, John Henry
Merryman, Edward Rewolinski, Robert Rosenwald, and William Widen. I
accepted many of their comments and criticisms but, at my-and the reader's-
peril left others behind. Accordingly, shortcomings in this paper are entirely
mine. I benefited greatly from the work and suggestions of my research
assistants, most prominently Gayland Hethcoat, and William Joseph Bucciero,
Michael Ford, Michael Greenfield, Richard Rosengarten, Omar Salazar, and
Jason Sosnovsky. I especially thank the superb staff of the Library of the
University of Miami School of Law for the many ways they have assisted my
work.
1. See Orkin v. Taylor, 487 F.3d 734, 736 (9th Cir. 2007) ("From the
time of Adolf Hitler's election as Chancellor of Germany in 1933 until the end
of World War 1I, Hitler's Nazi regime engaged in a systematic effort to
confiscate thousands of works of art throughout Europe."); MICHAEL J.
BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE: THE BATTLE FOR RESTITUTION IN AMERICA'S
COURTS 202 (2003) ("Between 1933 and 1945, the Germans stole
approximately 600,000 pieces of art from both museums and private collections
throughout Europe, including paintings, sculpture, objects [sic] d'art, and
tapestries.").
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daunting.2  Indeed, relatively few claims for restitution of
Holocaust art were filed in United States courts until more than
fifty years following the close of World War II. That half-century
gap is central to this discussion because it provides current
possessors with a significant advantage over Holocaust art
claimants: an affirmative defense predicated on the statute of
limitations. That advantage diminishes impetus to settle prior to
trial and can lead to judicial decisions based on procedural grounds
rather than the merits.'
This article describes an approach to the restitution of Holocaust
art that would avoid state statutes of limitations by relying on
federal civil forfeiture proceedings predicated on violations of the
2. Researching the provenance, that is, the history of ownership, of
Holocaust art is painstakingly difficult, often requiring reference to archives in
multiple countries and the ability to read multiple languages. For an
introduction to the issues and difficulties, see NANCY H. YEIDE, KONSTANTIN
AKINSHA & AMY L. WALSH, THE AAM GUIDE TO PROVENANCE RESEARCH
(2001) and Stephen K. Urice & Elizabeth Somerstein, Provenance:
Introductory Comments, SC40 A.L.I.-A.B.A (1998) (unpaginated insert; on file
with author).
3. The first case involving Holocaust art in U.S. courts was filed in the
mid-1960s, more than twenty years after the close of World War 11. See Menzel
v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 1966), modified as to damages, 279
N.Y.S.2d 608 (App. Div. 1967), rev'd, 246 N.E.2d 742 (N.Y. 1969).
4. See, e.g., Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592
F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, No. 09-1254, 2011 WL 2518833 (U.S.
June 27, 2011); Adler v. Taylor, No. CV 04-8472-RGK(FMOX), 2005 WL
4658511 (C.D. Cal., Feb. 2, 2005), aff'dsub nom. Orkin v. Taylor, 487 F.3d 734
(9th Cir. 2007). The statute-of-limitations obstacle has not gone unnoticed. For
example, California has twice enacted legislation extending the statute of
limitations specifically for Holocaust art claims. In 2010, the Ninth Circuit held
that the first of these, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.3 (West 2003), constituted
an unconstitutional state infringement on the federal foreign affairs power. Von
Saher, 592 F.3d at 963-68. In response, later that year, the California legislature
enacted a new statute drafted to avoid the constitutional deficiencies of the prior
one. See CAL. ClV. PROC. CODE § 338(c)(3) (West 2011). For a succinct
critique of the new statute, see Simon J. Frankel & John Freed, Statute Without
Limits?, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 20, 2010, at 7. For arguments that the new statute
is unconstitutional, see Notice of Demurrer to Complaint, General Demurrer to
Complaint, and Memorandum of Points and Authorities, W. Prelacy of the
Armenian Apostolic Church of Am. v. J. Paul Getty Museum, No. BC 438824
(Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 27, 2011).
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National Stolen Property Act (NSPA). Although the NSPA is not
a forfeiture statute, acts indictable under the NSPA can lead to
civil forfeiture under other provisions of federal law.' If the
government prevails in a forfeiture action, it has authority to
transfer forfeited property to the victim of the original theft-in
these cases, Holocaust victims or their heirs.' Accordingly, this
paper argues that in cases in which individual plaintiffs are likely
to be time-barred in state courts, the United States could act on
their behalf Such action is strongly supported by long-standing,
clearly-articulated U.S. policies favoring restitution of Holocaust
art.' However, this paper also asks whether the United States
should pursue such action under the novel interpretation of the
NSPA described here. That question arises out of two concerns.
First, this approach of the NSPA demonstrates the difficulties of
applying a general theft statute aimed at controlling the market in
stolen fungible goods to unique cultural property. Second, statutes
of limitations have long had powerful justifications and judicial
support; an end-run around state statutes of limitations by even
clear federal statutory authority raises troubling concerns.
II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
Claims in U.S. courts for restitution of Holocaust art were rarely
brought in the first half-century following the close of World War
II. In addition to the profound psychological and emotional issues
confronting Holocaust survivors,9 the practicalities of learning the
5. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2311-18 (2006).
6. See discussion infra Part IV.
7. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(e)(6) (2006) ("[The government] is authorized to
retain property forfeited pursuant to this section, or to transfer such property on
such terms and conditions as [it] may determine . . . as restoration to any victim
of the offense giving rise to the forfeiture ....
8. See discussion infra Part VI.
9. See, e.g., Kaslow, The Lingering Holocaust, 30(6) PROF.
PSYCHOLOGY: RESEARCH & PRACTICE 611, 613 (1999) (discussing the common
experience, referred to as the "conspiracy of silence," of Holocaust survivors
"trying to repress the memories of and the feelings about the awful events that
had occurred."); see also Jennifer Anglim Kreder, The Holocaust, Museum
2011] 3
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whereabouts of displaced cultural property and building sufficient
evidence to present claims presented formidable obstacles. 1o
Today, the delay itself has become an impediment for at least three
reasons. First, and most simply, state statutes of limitations are
likely to have expired. Second, in a jurisdiction where the statute
of limitations may not have run, notably New York, which applies
a "demand and refusal" rule to govern running of the statute of
limitations, the equitable defense of laches may have an equivalent
effect in barring claims. Third, state legislation to extend the
statute of limitations specifically for Holocaust art claims faces
constitutional barriers. These are serious obstacles. A recent
review of New York stolen art cases concluded: "[T]aking into
consideration these recent developments [i.e., New York courts'
increasing receptivity to the equitable defense of laches] it is
justified to say that, henceforth, (heirs of) Holocaust survivors will
likely no longer prevail in any attempt to obtain recovery of their
stolen heirlooms."" And the most prolific scholar on Holocaust
art litigation commented recently on the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena-holding
unconstitutional a California statute extending the statute of
Ethics and Legalism, 18 S. CAL. REv. L. & Soc. JusT. 1, 3 (2008) (emphasizing
the "emotional toll endured by a survivor or heirs litigating a claim").
10. Merely documenting prior ownership is a preliminary hurdle made
more complicated by the loss of records of ownership. This problem is
particularly acute when the original owner failed to survive the Holocaust, and
heirs are unaware of their family's collections. The situation is analogous to a
modus operandi for museum insider theft: the thief steals both the object and, in
pre-computer registries, the museum's documentation for the object. The
museum, thus, is left without knowledge that it should have the stolen object,
and the object itself has disappeared. A recent instance of this practice is
described in Ton Cremers' . . . And the Curator Did It, a presentation given at
the AXA Art Conference on November 1, 2005. The curator of the Army
Museum in Delft, Alexander Polman, was found to have stolen books and prints
from the museum's library. It is unknown exactly how many prints were stolen,
"for Polman also made the old handwritten registration [of the stolen works]
disappear . . . ." Ton Cremers, Museums Security Network, Presentation at the
AXA Art Conference: . . . And the Curator Did It (Nov. 1, 2005) (transcript
available at http://www.museum-security.org/insider-theft.pdf).
11. Bert Demarsin, Has The Time (of Laches) Come? Recent Nazi-Era
Art Litigation in the New York Forum, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 621, 691 (2011).
4 [Vol. XXII:1I
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limitations for Holocaust art claims on grounds that it
impermissibly infringed on the federal foreign affairs power-that
"[i]f the Supreme Court does not correct Von Saher, then the need
for Congress to enact federal legislation eliminating the statute of
limitations defense in Holocaust-era art cases is acute."l2 The
Supreme Court denied certiorari in Von Saher on June 27, 2011.13
In short, civil claimants now confront significant barriers based on
the passage of time.
In the United States, concerted efforts to define and address the
complex legal, ethical, and moral questions presented by
Holocaust art did not begin until the 1990s. While some
commentators have blamed the lag on Holocaust survivors'
suppressed memory of events between 1933 and 1945,14 a more
careful observer sees another factor. The art market in the post-
war decades demonstrated an astonishing capacity to forget: Even
before the war ended, and immediately after, books and widely
circulating periodicals documented the massive scale of Nazi
plundering. 5 The art world, though aware of war-time spoliation
of cultural property, had no interest in opening that Pandora's Box.
12. Jennifer Anglim Kreder, State Law Holocaust-Era Art Claims and
Federal Executive Power, 105 Nw. UNIV. L. REV. COLLOQUY 315, 331 (2011).
13. Von Saher v. Norton Simon Art Museum at Pasadena, No. 09-1254,
2011 WL 2518833 (U.S. June 27, 2011).
14. See supra note 10.
15. See, e.g., GEORGE MIHAN, LOOTED TREASURE: GERMANY'S RAID ON
ART (1944); THOMAS CARR HOWE, JR., SALT MINES AND CASTLES: THE
DISCOVERING AND RESTITUTION OF LOOTED EUROPEAN ART (1946); James S.
Plaut, Loot for the Master Race, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1946,
http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/unbound/flashbks/nazigold/loot.htm;
James S. Plaut, Hitler's Capital, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1946,
http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/unbound/flashbks/nazigold/hitler.htm;
Janet Flanner, The Beautiful Spoils, NEW YORKER, Feb. 22, 1947, at 31. For a
chronological compilation of publications, see Constance Lowenthal & Stephen
Urice, Chronological Check List of Significant Developments, Publications, and
Cases Regarding Holocaust Period Art in the United States, Art Law Centre:
International Symposium on Claims for the Restitution of Looted Art, Geneva,
November 10, 2000. For reasons not yet explored in the literature, these early
descriptions of Nazi looting seem to have had little impact on art dealers and
collectors in the decades following World War 11, when many of the works at
issue in Holocaust art disputes appeared on the art market.
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Both factors contributed to the situation in which Holocaust
victims and current possessors are, today, plaintiffs and
defendants.
A new wave of publications and other events in the 1990s,16
brought Holocaust art issues into a broad discussion among
journalists, legal scholars, the art world, and the public. That
discussion led to three significant outcomes. First, it secured a
place for Holocaust art in the wider debate of restitution efforts
involving other kinds of assets (e.g., life insurance, real property,
bank accounts) that emerged in the 1990s among Holocaust
victims, their attorneys, and policymakers." Second, it led the
16. For books, see, for example, LYNN H. NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF
EUROPA: THE FATE OF EUROPE'S TREASURES IN THE THIRD REICH AND SECOND
WORLD WAR (1994) and HECTOR FELICIANO, THE LOST MUSEUM: THE NAZI
CONSPIRACY TO STEAL THE WORLD'S GREATEST WORKS OF ART (1997), the
latter of which was published in French a year earlier. Other developments
include the first academic symposium on the subject, The Spoils of War-World
War II and Its Aftermath: The Loss, Reappearance, and Recovery of Cultural
Property, organized and sponsored by the Bard Graduate Center for Studies in
the Decorative Arts in New York in January of 1995, see THE SPOILS OF WAR-
WORLD WAR II AND ITS AFTERMATH: THE Loss, REAPPEARANCE, AND
RECOVERY OF CULTURAL PROPERTY (Elizabeth Simpson ed. 1997) (collecting
proceedings from the symposium), and an exhibition, Degenerate Art: The Fate
of the Avant Garde in Nazi Germany, that opened at the Los Angeles County
Museum of Art on February 17, 1991. See STEPHANIE BARRON, DEGENERATE
ART: THE FATE OF THE AVANT-GARDE IN NAZI GERMANY (1991) (exhibition
catalog). A chronological bibliography of other publications appears in
Lowenthal & Urice, supra note 16.
17. Two reasons for the emergence of Holocaust art claims in the early
1990s are the subject of various interpretations. A straightforward assessment is
provided by the Commission for Art Recovery:
In the early 1990s, a new focus on the entire issue of Holocaust-era art claims
came about for a number of reasons. Several scholarly and popular books
addressed the problems and found a wide audience, not only among aging
survivors and their grown children, but in the general public. The fall of the
USSR, dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the unification of East and West
Germany produced new possibilities for claimants to approach governments and
museums in formerly communist Europe. Dramatic news of the survival of art
masterpieces hidden for decades in Moscow and Leningrad prompted a
reappraisal of what had been destroyed in the war. A growing interest in other
assets including real estate, bank accounts, and life insurance policies revived
[Vol. XXII:1I6
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executive branch to articulate new U.S. policies supporting
restitution of Holocaust art.'" Third, it promoted the
institutionalization of restitution efforts." Those outcomes
manifested themselves quickly. On the part of collectors, U.S.
museums undertook research to identify and make known works in
their collections that were known to have been in Europe between
1932 and 1945 and had a lacuna in their provenance.20 On the part
memories of the material losses and the post-war injustices that left the business
of restitution unfinished.
Overview, COMMISSION FOR ART RECOVERY,
http://www.commartrecovery.org/content/overview (last visited Nov. 19, 2011);
see also MICHAEL R. MARRUS, SOME MEASURE OF JUSTICE: THE HOLOCAUST
ERA RESTITUTION CAMPAIGN OF THE 1990s, at 60-84 (2009) (contextualizing
the emergence of Holocaust restitution claims in the 1990s within both the
general human rights concerns that flourished at that time and broader
developments, such as the lifting of the Iron Curtain, which allowed greater
access to archives and other sources of information); Israel Singer, Why Now?,
20 CARDOZO L. REV. 421 (1998) (attributing the emergence of claims to greater
Holocaust awareness, accomplished by popular movies such as Schindler's List
and books such as Hitler's Willing Executioners).
18. See infra Part VI.A.
19. These included private efforts such as the World Jewish Congress's
Commission for Art Recovery, founded in 1997, see About, COMMISSION FOR
ART RECOVERY, http://www.commartrecovery.org/content/about (last visited
Nov. 19, 2011), and the Holocaust Art Restitution Project, also founded in 1997,
see About, PLUNDERED ART http://plundered-art.blogspot.com/p/about.html (last
visited Nov. 19, 2011). Public efforts included the Presidential Advisory
Commission on Holocaust Assets in the United States (PCHA), established by
Congress in 1998 to develop a record of Holocaust-era assets possessed by the
federal government. PCHA's work culminated in a lengthy report issued in
2001, which many felt was inadequate, especially with respect to looted art. See
Ralph Blumenthal, Panel on Nazi Art Theft Fell Short, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 2003, at El. On a state level, Governor Pataki of New York created the
Holocaust Claims Processing Office of the New York State Banking
Department in 1997 to "provide institutional assistance to individuals seeking to
recover Holocaust-looted assets . . . ." History and Mission, HOLOCAUST
CLAIMS PROCESSING OFFICE, http://www.claims.state.ny.us/hist.htm (last visited
Nov. 19, 2011).
20. In 1999, the American Association of Museums (AAM), the largest
U.S. museum service organization, adopted guidelines urging museums to
undertake research to identify works in their collections with a gap in
provenance between 1933 and 1945 and to make that information public. See
AM. Ass'N OF MUSEUMS, GUIDELINES CONCERNING THE UNLAWFUL
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of Holocaust victims and their heirs, the number of claims for
restitution grew rapidly. Nevertheless, despite these developments
and the massive scale of Nazi looting, fewer than seventy claims
for restitution of Holocaust art are documented in the United
States.2
APPROPRIATION OF OBJECTS DURING THE NAZI ERA (2001) [hereinafter AAM
GUIDELINES], available at http://www.aam-
us.org/museumresources/ethics/nazi guidelines.cfm. A year earlier, in 1998,
the Association of Art Museum Directors (AAMD), representing the directors of
the approximately 200 largest art museums in North America, had promulgated
guidelines with similar focus of the AAM's subsequent report. Among the
guidelines, one states that "members of the AAMD, if they have not already
done so, should begin immediately to review the provenance of works in their
collections to attempt to ascertain whether any were unlawfully confiscated
during the Nazi/World War IL era and never restituted." AsS'N OF ART
MUSEUM DIRS., REPORT OF THE AAMD TASK FORCE ON THE SPOLIATION OF
ART DURING THE NAZI/WORLD WAR 11 ERA (1933-1945) § II(A)(1) (1998)
[hereinafter AAMD REPORT], available at
http://www.aamd.org/papers/guideln.php. Another states that "[m]ember
museums should facilitate access to the Nazi/World-War-II-era provenance
information of all works of art in their collections." Id. § II(C)(1).
Of course, no equivalent guidelines exist for personal collections, inventory in
commercial galleries, and other privately maintained holdings. See Review of
the Repatriation of Holocaust Art Assets in the United States: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Domestic & Int'l Monetary Policy, Trade, and Tech. of the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 109th Cong. 104-124 (2006) (statement of Stuart E.
Eizenstat, Former Commissioner Presidential Advisory Commission on
Holocaust Assets U.S.) (discussing "the difficulty of producing evidence of
ownership" and public attempts at amassing information to create central
registries for Holocaust art restitution claims. In contrast to public efforts,
Eizenstat commented, "sadly, the private dealers are not providing this [kind of
information]").
21. The numbers in this paragraph and in the remainder of the paper are
approximations, drawn from the following three sources: Stephen W. Clark &
Eliza Jacobs, Litigation Update: Legal Issues in Museum Administration 2011
Case Summaries, SS024 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 247, 259-91; Jennifer Anglim Kreder,
Chart of Dismissed Federal Holocaust Claims (June 9, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1636295; and HERRICK,
FEINSTEIN LLP, RESOLVED STOLEN ART CLAIMS (Mar. 3, 2011), available at
http://www.herrick.com/siteFiles/Publications/09537E70916BOO44E6A2Bl464
074Fl37.pdf.
8 [Vol. XXII:1I
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Some current possessors have proved cooperative in efforts to
balance legal and ethical issues presented by Holocaust art claims.
For example, the U.S. museum community has adopted ethical
standards favoring resolution of legitimate claims through
mediation and acknowledging that museums may waive available
defenses, such as statutes of limitations or laches.22 The guidelines
appear to have had an impact. More than eighty percent of the
fifty claims involving museums have settled out of court. In all
but one of those settlements either the work of art was restituted or
its value (or an agreed portion of its value) was paid to the
claimant.2 3 Ethical standards and professional guidelines
applicable to public institutions do not, of course, bind private
parties. Of the handful of claims involving individuals alleged to
be in possession of Holocaust art, fewer than half have settled. Of
22. AAM's guidelines state in pertinent part:
If a museum determines that an object in its collection was unlawfully
appropriated during the Nazi era without subsequent restitution, the museum
should seek to resolve the matter with the claimant in an equitable, appropriate,
and mutually agreeable manner. . .. AAM acknowledges that in order to achieve
an equitable and appropriate resolution of claims, museums may elect to waive
certain available defenses.
AAM GUIDELINES, supra note 21, § 4(c), (f). AAMD's guidelines include the
following language:
If a member museum should determine that a work of art in its
collection was illegally confiscated during the Nazi/World
War 11 era and not restituted . . . the museum should offer to
resolve the matter in an equitable, appropriate, and mutually
agreeable manner. . . . AAMD recommends that member
museums consider using mediation wherever reasonably
practical to help resolve claims regarding art illegally
confiscated during the Nazi/World War 11 era and not
restituted.
AAMD REPORT, supra note 21, §§ II(D)(1)-(2), (E)(3). For a negative
assessment of United States museums' actions, see Jennifer Anglim Kreder,
Essay, Guarding the Historical Record from the Nazi-Era Litigation Tumbling
Toward the Supreme Court, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 253 (2011),
available at http://www.pennumbra.com/essays/04-201 1/Kreder.pdf.
23. Generally, the financial terms of settlements are not publicly
available, making it impossible to speculate whether they approach current fair
market value of the works.
2011] 9
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the others that have concluded, the results are approximately
evenly balanced between claimants and current possessors.
In a number of disputes involving both museums and individual
possessors, the cases have been decided not on the merits or by
findings of facts that clarify the history of the works in question,
but, instead, by successful assertion of a statute-of-limitations
defense.24 One of those was a case involving the late actress
Elizabeth Taylor" and a painting by Vincent van Gogh.
III. ELIZABETH TAYLOR'S VAN GOGH 26
In April 1963 Elizabeth Taylor's father, an art dealer acting on
behalf of his daughter, placed a winning bid of E92,000 for
Vincent van Gogh's painting, Vue de l'Asile et de la Chapelle de
Saint-Remy,27 at a public auction at Sotheby's in London. Forty-
24. Additionally, in two cases involving museums that did not settle the
museums brought declaratory judgment actions preemptively to quiet title. The
museums prevailed when the courts determined that applicable statutes of
limitations had run against the claimants. See Detroit Inst. of Arts v. Ullin, No.
06-10333, 2007 WL 1016996 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2007) (finding that the
statute of limitations began to run against the claimants in 1938, three years
after the alleged coerced sale of the work occurred); Toledo Museum of Art v.
Ullin, 477 F. Supp. 2d 802 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (determining that the statute of
limitations had run against claimants who, under the applicable discovery rule,
should have learned of the disputed painting's whereabouts in 1939). For a
discussion of these cases, see Andrew Adler, Expanding the Scope of Museums'
Ethical Guidelines with Respect to Nazi-Looted Art: Incorporating Restitution
Claims Based on Private Sales Made as a Direct Result of Persecution, 14
INT'L. J. CULT. PROP. 57 (2007).
25. Taylor died on March 23, 2011. Mel Gussow, A Lustrous Pinnacle of
Hollywood Glamour, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2011, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/24/movies/elizabeth-taylor-obituary.html.
26. The facts summarized here are detailed in Orkin v. Taylor, 487 F.3d
734, 735-38 (9th Cir. 2007).
27. Color images of the disputed van Gogh appear in the auction sales
catalogues. See SOTHEBY & CO., CATALOGUE OF THE COLLECTION OF
IMPRESSIONIST AND POST-IMPRESSIONIST PAINTINGS: THE PROPERTY OF THE
LATE ALFRED WOLF OF STUTTGART AND SOUTH AMERICA 20 (1963), and
CHRISTIE'S VUE DE L'ASILE ET DE LA CHAPELLE DE SAINT-RMY BY VINCENT
VAN GOGH 17 (1990); see also "Vue de lAsile et de la Chapelle de Saint-
Remy, " CHRISTIE'S IMAGES VIA BLOOMBERG,
[Vol. XXII:1I10
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two years later, a federal district court in California granted
Taylor's motion to dismiss claims asserted against her by the heirs
of Margarete Mauthner (the "claimants") for recovery of the
painting. The claimants alleged that Mauthner purchased the
painting in 1914 and that her ownership of the painting is
evidenced by its inclusion in catalogues raisonnis of van Gogh's
works published in 1928 and 1939 identifying Mauthner as the
owner.28 They alleged further that in the face of increasing Nazi
persecution of Jews, Mauthner and her family fled their home in
Berlin in 1939 and settled in South Africa where Mauthner died at
age eighty-four in 1947.29 The circumstances surrounding
Mauthner's loss of the van Gogh are "clouded in uncertainty."3 0
The claimants alleged Mauthner parted with the painting in a
coerced sale; Taylor asserted that there was no evidence of
coercion or Nazi participation in the sale.3 The claimants further
alleged that the 1963 Sotheby's auction catalogue presented a
patently false (or mistaken) provenance (Figure 1). Although the
description refers to the entries for the painting in the 1928 and
1939 catalogues raisonn6s (in which Mauthner is listed as the
painting's owner), the description also states that the well-known
German art dealer Paul Cassirer was the owner of the painting
after Mauthner. Cassirer, however, died by suicide in 1926.32 The
claimants alleged that this discrepancy could easily have been
http://www.bloomberg.com/photo/-vue-de-l-asile-et-de-la-chapelle-de-saint-
remy-/105541.html (last visited December 21, 2011).
28. Complaint for Restitution and Damages Under the Holocaust Victims
Redress Act and Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act (112 Statutes 15; 114 Statutes
2865) 1 18, Adler v. Taylor, No. CV 04-8472-RGK(FMOX), 2005 WL 4658511
(C.D. Cal., Feb. 2, 2005) [hereinafter Complaint].
29. For a report on research undertaken by the New York State Holocaust
Claims Processing Office (HCPO) about a different van Gogh owned by Mrs.
Mauthner and background on the Mauthner family's persecution in Berlin and
their flight to safety, see Adler, supra note 25, at 65 n.22. The HCPO concluded
that Mrs. Mauthner's sale of that work "was a 'flight asset,' i.e., a cultural asset
that was sold because of the extreme situation of the time to finance
[Mauthner's] family's day-to-day survival and imminent emigration from Nazi
Germany." Id. (citation omitted).
30. Orkin, 487 F.3d at 737.
3 1. Id.
32. Complaint, supra note 29, 20.
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discovered by, and would have informed, a diligent purchaser of
the earlier coerced sale." Either unaware of the questionable
provenance or in disregard of it, Taylor acquired the work and held
it in her collection for decades. In 1990, Taylor unsuccessfully
attempted to sell the painting at Christie's in London. The
catalogue for the 1990 auction gave a significantly different
provenance than the one Sotheby's published in 1963 (Figure 2): It
indicated that Cassirer owned the painting prior to Mauthner and
listed a Frankfurt art dealer as the owner subsequent to her. The
claimants alleged that those changes indicate that by 1990 Taylor
was aware that the 1963 provenance was incorrect and that even
with that awareness failed to investigate the painting's history.
The claimants asserted that such investigation would have
indicated Mauthner's ownership in Nazi Germany.34
Following the parties' unsuccessful efforts to settle the dispute,
Taylor filed a complaint for declaratory relief to establish title to
the van Gogh in 2004." Subsequently, the claimants filed their
own law suit seeking recovery of the painting. In 2005, the federal
district court granted Taylor's motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim on grounds that the applicable California statute of
limitations began to run in 1963, barring the claimants' assertion
of their claims.36 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,"3
and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Given the circumstances of World War II and especially given
the fate of art collections owned by German Jews, the facts
presented do not surprise: A work of art, well-documented as
having been owned by a Jewish collector in Germany during the
33. Id. T 18-20.
34. Complaint, supra note 29, TT 21, 29-31.
35. Orkin, 487 F.3d at 738.
36. Adler v. Taylor, No. CV 04-8472-RGK(FMOX), 2005 WL 4658511,
at *5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2005). The district court found that the statute of
limitations began to run when Taylor acquired the painting in 1963. Id. at *4. It
noted that subsequent legislation included an explicit "discovery rule" and that
there remains a conflict among California courts of appeal whether the prior
statute of limitations had an implied discovery rule. Id. The court rejected that
interpretation of the earlier statute. Id. at *4-5.
37. Orkin, 487 F.3d at 736.
38. Orkin v. Taylor, 552 U.S. 990 (2007).
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Third Reich, appears on the art market twenty years after the war.
It is bought, apparently in good faith, at public auction. In
response to developments in the 1990s, heirs of a Holocaust victim
assert a claim for the painting. The court dismisses the claim as
time-barred, never hearing evidence or finding facts that would
establish the credibility-if any-of the claimants' allegations.
The cloud of uncertainty as to what happened to the painting
during the war remains without judicial clarification."
This paper asks whether a different result might have occurred
under a federal civil forfeiture action. Put another way, had the
case been United States v. One Painting by Vincent van Gogh
rather than Adler v. Taylor (Adler), what might the outcome have
been?
IV. THE NATIONAL STOLEN PROPERTY ACT AND CIVIL FORFEITURE
ACTIONs
The NSPA is a general theft, criminal statute.40 Other federal
statutes authorize the government to bring civil forfeiture
39. In an influential article published early in the development of art law
as a distinct academic discipline, John Henry Merryman pioneered an attempt to
articulate the public's interest in works of art and other forms of cultural
property. See J.H. Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77 CAL.
L. REV. 339 (1989). Professor Merryman identified three key elements of the
public interest: preservation, access, and truth. Id. at 345. In this case, the
financial value of the van Gogh assures that the public interest in its
preservation is likely to be protected. Its aesthetic significance provides
reasonable assurance that the work will eventually migrate from private hands
into a museum collection where the public will have access to it. However, the
public interest of truth has been and will remain badly served. The procedural
stance of the case required the court to accept the claimants' allegations as true.
There was no opportunity for the opposing parties to present evidence and for a
neutral fact-finder to weigh that evidence. Thus, the opportunity to determine
what actually happened to the work during the Third Reich has been, of legal
necessity, postponed to a later time when documents, memories, and other
potential evidence may be even less available. That delay diminishes the
possibility that the work's history will ever be clarified.
40. The NSPA is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2311-18 (2006). Section 2311
provides definitions for purposes of the statute. The two operative provisions-
§§ 2314-15-are related: in general, the first criminalizes transportation of
stolen goods; the second, receipt and possession of them. For a discussion of
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proceedings against the stolen property involved in any act
indictable under the NSPA.4 1 Such in rem forfeiture actions
proceed independently of, and do not require the government to
pursue, an in personam criminal proceeding under the NSPA.42
Accordingly, the government has significant discretion in applying
the NSPA: It can prosecute the person involved in the illegal act,
initiate civil forfeiture proceedings against the property involved,
or both.43 This flexibility, of course, provides the government with
significant negotiating leverage.
the NSPA's background and history, see United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407,
413-17 (1957).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) provides that property "which constitutes . .
a violation of . . . any offense constituting 'specified unlawful activity' (as
defined in section 1956(c)(7) of this title)" is subject to forfeiture to the United
States. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(A) defines "specified unlawful activity" to mean
"any act or activity constituting an offense listed in section 1961(1) of this title .
... 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) includes "any act which is indictable under" the
NSPA. Although 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) constitutes a component of the U.S.
Code describing racketeering crimes, at least one court has held that a violation
of a statutory provision cross-referenced in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) need not be in
the context of a RICO violation to come within this statutory chain. See United
States v. 16899 S.W. Greenbrier, 774 F. Supp. 1267, 1273-74 (D. Or. 1991).
For discussions of civil forfeiture in the context of cultural property, see Stefan
D. Cassella, Using the Forfeiture Laws to Protect Archaeological Resources, 41
IDAHO L. REV. 129, 132-33 (2004), and Jennifer Anglim Kreder, The Choice
Between Civil and Criminal Remedies in Stolen Art Litigation, 38 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1199, 1222-23 (2005).
42. See, e.g., Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397 (1938) (holding
that acquittal on a criminal charge did not bar a civil forfeiture proceeding
against the property involved in the alleged crime); United States v. U.S.
Currency, 626 F.2d 11, 12 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that invocation of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination did not require dismissal of a
forfeiture proceeding to recover the property involved in the alleged crime).
Cassella observes generally: "civil forfeiture cases do not require a criminal
conviction and proceed independent of any criminal trial." Cassella, supra note
42, at 132.
43. Additionally, the United States can bring criminal forfeiture
proceedings if it pursues a criminal indictment under the NSPA:
Section 981(a)(1)(C) . . . is a civil forfeiture statute. Standing alone, it does not
authorize criminal forfeiture. But 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) has been amended to
authorize the criminal forfeiture of any property for which civil forfeiture is
authorized. Therefore, taken together, these two statutes authorize the
[Vol. XXII:1I14
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In 1986, Congress added possession of stolen property as an
enumerated crime under 18 U.S.C. § 2315.4 Previously, only the
receipt, concealment, storage, barter, or disposition of stolen goods
constituted criminal acts under that section.45 Congress had two
purposes in criminalizing possession: expanding the base of
potential defendants and resolving a jurisdictional problem.46
Congress achieved more than those two goals. While the other
government to include notice of criminal forfeiture in any criminal indictment
filed after August 23, 2000, in which any "specified unlawful activity" [as
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)] is alleged.
Stefan D. Cassella, The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000: Expanded
Government Forfeiture Authority and Strict Deadlines Imposed on All Parties,
27 J. LEGIS. 97, 119 n.133 (2001).
44. See Criminal Law and Procedure Technical Amendments Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-646, § 76, 100 Stat. 3592. Congress enacted the National
Stolen Property Act in 1934 to replace the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act,
significantly expanding the kinds of stolen and counterfeit properties subject to
federal criminal law. See National Stolen Property Act, ch. 333, 48 Stat. 794
(1934). The legislative history of the NSPA is discussed in part in George W.
Nowell, American Tools to Control the Illegal Movement of Foreign Origin
Archaeological Materials: Criminal and Civil Approaches, 6 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L. L. & COM. 77, 89-91 (1978), and Graham Green, Evaluating the
Application of the National Stolen Property Act to Art Trafficking Cases, 44
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 251 (2007).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 2315 reads in pertinent part as follows:
Whoever receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes of any
goods, wares, or merchandise, securities, or money of the value of $5,000 or
more, . . . which have crossed a State or United States boundary after being
stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken, knowing the same to have been stolen,
unlawfully converted, or taken . .. [s]hall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than ten years, or both.
46. See 131 CONG. REC. S7399 (1985) ("[The addition of] a possession
offense [is intended] so that the section will reach persons who knowingly
possess stolen property that has moved in interstate or foreign commerce as well
as those who receive, conceal, or store such property. While obviously a person
who possesses such property must have received it, a successful prosecution of a
receipt-of-stolen-property case requires proof that the person received the
property in the district of prosecution. The addition of a possession offense
eliminates the requirement that the government prove that the defendant first
received the stolen property in a particular district, an element which is
sometimes difficult to prove and which has no bearing on the defendant's
criminal culpability." (citation omitted)).
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enumerated crimes in § 2315 occur at a moment or over short
periods,47 possession extends through time. Congress thus
expanded the NSPA's temporal reach by criminalizing a
continuing offense that does not tenninate until the stolen property
is dispossessed.4 8
Congress simultaneously amended the first paragraph of 18
U.S.C. § 2315, replacing the former requirement that stolen goods
be in interstate commerce with a simpler rule: The section now
applies to "[goods] which have crossed a State or United States
boundary after being stolen . .. ."4 Congress's purpose in making
this amendment was to eliminate a defense predicated on stolen
goods' having left interstate commerce-either by "coming to
rest" or as a result of the passage of time. 0
In conjunction, these amendments produce remarkable results.
At a minimum, they effectively eliminate a statute of limitations
for forfeiture actions based on possession of stolen goods:
Possession is an ongoing offense; each moment of possession is, in
47. An exception is concealment. United States v. Mardirosian, 602 F.3d
1, 9 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Frezzo, 659 F. Supp. 54, 57-58
(E.D. Pa. 1987)) (noting, in a case involving stolen paintings, that "possession
and concealment of stolen property is a continuous crime").
48. See Mardirosian, 602 F.3d at 9; see also Annotation, Possession of
Stolen Property as Continuing Offense, 24 A.L.R. 5th 132 (1994).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (2006). The amendment has survived
constitutional challenge. See United States v. Trupin, 117 F.3d 678, 682-85 (2d
Cir. 1997) (holding, inter alia, that the amended language of 18 U.S.C. § 2315
was a legitimate exercise of Congress's power to regulate channels of interstate
commerce and not unconstitutional under United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995)).
50. Congress explained its legislative purpose as follows:
The second change, which is related to the first [adding "possession" to the
statute], eliminates the present requirement that the property still be considered
as moving in interstate or foreign commerce at the time the defendant receives,
conceals, or disposes of it. Although the courts have construed the "in
commerce" requirement broadly, this requirement is also unnecessarily
burdensome and is unrelated to the blameworthiness of the defendant's conduct.
131 CONG. REC. S7399 (1985) (citation omitted). Two years later, Congress
reversed course for purposes of the second paragraph of the statute, reinserting
the explicit requirement of "interstate or foreign commerce," but did not do so
in the first paragraph. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690,
§§ 7048, 7057(b); Trupin, 117 F.3d at 683.
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effect, a new violation that continuously restarts the statute of
limitations, which is "five years after the time when the alleged
offense was discovered . . . ."' Moreover, Congress eliminated
the argument that the statute of limitations commenced when
stolen property left interstate commerce: 18 U.S.C. § 2315 now
requires proof only that the property crossed a state or U.S.
boundary after it was stolen. That fact, once it has occurred, never
changes. Thus, the only way a current possessor can start the
statute of limitations running against the government is to
dispossess herself of the stolen property.52 A broader
interpretation of these amendments, discussed below, leads to the
conclusion that they transform stolen goods into contraband:
property to which one may even have good title but not a right of
possession.
51. 19 U.S.C. § 1621 (2006). The statute of limitations for an action
under 18 U.S.C. § 981 is determined by reference to 19 U.S.C. § 1621. See
Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, §§ 11, 21, 114
Stat. 202, 217, 225 (amending 19 U.S.C. § 1621 and mandating that "this Act
and the amendments made by this Act shall apply to any forfeiture proceeding
commenced on or after the date that is 120 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act"). As an alternative to the five-year period, the government can
initiate a timely forfeiture action "within 2 years after the time when the
involvement of the property in the alleged offense was discovered, whichever
was later. . . ." 19 U.S.C. § 1621. The "alleged offense" is the illicit possession
of stolen property, which is ongoing-as opposed to receipt, for example, which
may have occurred at a moment or over a short period more than five years prior
to the forfeiture action. See, e.g., United States v. 5443 Suffield Terrace, 607
F.3d 504, 508 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that "[w]hen there are multiple, distinct
underlying crimes that independently could support forfeiture of the same
property, nothing in the plain language of § 1621 bars a court from adjudicating
a forfeiture action as long as at least one alleged offense is not time-barred, even
if the statute of limitations has run on the remainder of the underlying crimes"
and upholding the forfeiture action "based not on [the claimant's] attempted
smuggling of cigars into the country in April 1996, but on the discovery of
smuggled cigars in his house in March 1997 and October 1999").
52. See Trupin, 117 F.3d at 686-87 (affirming the defendant's conviction
for possession of art he knew to be stolen after Congress amended the NSPA in
1986 to add possession as an actionable offense and holding that, to avoid
conviction, the defendant would have had to cease "his possession within a
reasonable time after the 1986 amendment").
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V. UNITED STATES V. ONE VAN GOGH PAINTING53
Although the United States has alleged violations of the NSPA
in three civil forfeiture cases involving Holocaust art, those
allegations involved underlying offenses of the receipt or transport
of stolen property.54 This section describes the NSPA's potential
role in situations in which there has been long-term possession
rather than recent receipt or sale. That role will be explored here
through the lens of a hypothetical case based on the alleged facts
presented in Adler.
In considering Taylor's motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6), the district court
was required to assume that the claimants' allegations were true.55
And for purposes of its review, the Ninth Circuit assumed that the
claimants' allegations were "true and that Mauthner was coerced
into giving up the painting before she left Germany. "5' Fully
53. Again, this discussion assumes the United States could prove all
elements of a prima facie case for possession of stolen property under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2315 and the claimants' allegations (e.g., that the Nazis stole or otherwise
wrongfully took the van Gogh and that it was never restituted to the claimants).
For assertions that the claimants presented no such evidence, see Jennifer
Anglim Kreder, The New Battleground of Museum Ethics and Holocaust-Era
Claims: Technicalities Trumping Justice or Responsible Stewardship for the
Public Trust?, 88 OR. L. REv. 37, 59-60 (2009); accord Jennifer Michelle
Anglim, The Choice between Civil and Criminal Remedies in Stolen Art
Litigation, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1199 (2005). In a recent email,
Professor Kreder stated that the claimants likely could have presented such
evidence with more research. E-mail from Professor Jennifer Anglim Kreder to
author (July 25, 2011, 13:35 EDT) (on file with author).
54. See United States v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232 (S.D.N.Y.
2009); United States v. One Oil Painting Entitled "Femme en Blanc" by Pablo
Picasso, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2005). In a third, more recent case,
the Complaint is too general to determine which NSPA violation is the basis for
the government's position. See United States v. One Julian Falat Painting
Entitled "Off to the Hunt," No. 1:10-cv-09291 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 13, 2010).
On July 19, 2011, the government filed a Notice of Motion for Default
Judgment in the case.
55. See Adler v. Taylor, No. CV 04-8472-RGK(FMOX), 2005 WL
4658511, at *1 (C.D. Cal., Feb. 2, 2005).
56. Orkin v. Taylor, 487 F.3d 734, 738 (9th Cir. 2007) ("Because the
district court dismissed this case on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we must assume
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understanding that no court has determined the facts in the case,
this paper will take the same position-assuming the claimants'
allegations to be true and provable by admissible evidence-in
analyzing two questions. First, had the United States brought a
civil forfeiture proceeding against the van Gogh in place of the
Mauthner heirs' suit against Taylor, what might the outcome have
been? Second, if the United States were to bring such a civil
forfeiture action after Taylor prevailed on a statute-of-limitations
defense, what might the outcome be? This paper concludes that
under either hypothetical the United States would likely prevail.
The plain language of the NSPA, congressional intent in
criminalizing possession of stolen property, and clearly articulated
statements of U.S. policy supporting restitution of Holocaust art
support a conclusion that the United States could have achieved-
and still could achieve-restitution of the painting. Put another
way, the NSPA as amended by Congress in 1986 permits the
United States to accomplish for Holocaust victims what they, at
law, may be time-barred from accomplishing for themselves.
A. United States v. One van Gogh Painting in the Absence of
Adler
What would the outcome of a civil forfeiture proceeding against
the van Gogh have been had the United States brought an action in
place of Adler?
Procedurally, a civil forfeiture action predicated on a violation
of the NSPA is straightforward. It commences with the issuance
of a warrant." To obtain a warrant, the government must
demonstrate to a magistrate judge that probable cause exists to
seize the property." In the subsequent forfeiture proceedings, the
that all facts stated in the complaint are true and that they are provable by
admissible evidence. . . . We assume, for the purposes of our discussion, that the
allegations of the complaint are true and that Mauthner was coerced into giving
up the painting before she left Germany.").
57. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(b) (2006).
58. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 981 (b)(2) (providing
generally that seizures pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981 "shall be made pursuant to a
warrant obtained in the same manner as provided for a search warrant under the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.").
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government carries the initial burden of proof to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the seized property was
involved in an act that violated the NSPA.59 Once the government
provides that proof, the burden shifts to the claimant to prove
either that the work is not subject to forfeiture60 or that the
claimant is an "innocent owner."6' If the government prevails in
the forfeiture proceeding, title to the property passes to the United
59. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1) (2006) ("In a suit or action brought under
any civil forfeiture statute for the civil forfeiture of any property, the burden of
proof is on the Government to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the property is subject to forfeiture."). Although it involved a different
forfeiture statute, United States v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232
(S.D.N.Y. 2009), exemplifies the burden-shifting in a forfeiture action. The
underlying offense in that case was the transportation of a stolen Nazi-era
painting into the United States. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 236.
Because the government initiated the forfeiture action pursuant to 19 U.S.C. §
1595a(c), a customs statute, its initial burden of proof was lighter than the
burden of proof under 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1): the government had merely to
demonstrate reasonable cause to believe both that the painting was stolen and
that the claimant knew it was stolen. See id. at 251. On crossing that relatively
low threshold, the burden then fell to the claimant to demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that the painting was not stolen. See id.
(citations omitted); see also United States v. Davis, 648 F.3d 84, 95-96 (2d Cir.
2011) (holding in a forfeiture action involving stolen artwork that the Civil
Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 did not change the burden of proof in a 19
U.S.C. § 1595a action).
60. See Cassella, supra note 43, at 108-09.
61. See, e.g., United States v. $493,850.00 in U.S. Currency, 518 F.3d
1159, 1170 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)) (describing the burden-
shifting). An innocent owner is a claimant who proves by a preponderance of
the evidence that he or she "(1) did not know of the conduct giving rise to
forfeiture; or (2) upon learning of the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture, did
all that reasonably could be expected under the circumstances to terminate such
use of the property." Id. at 1170 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(2)(A)). Obviously,
a current possessor who gains sufficient knowledge to satisfy the NSPA's
scienter requirement loses the protection of the innocent owner defense if she
remains in possession. Although an innocent owner defense is available in
forfeitures predicated on a violation of the NSPA, it is generally not available
for forfeitures predicated on a violation of United States customs' statutes
codified in Title 19 of the United States Code. See Davis, 648 F.3d at 93-94.
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States, 6 2 which has statutory authority to transfer forfeited property
to the victim of the original theft."
Substantively, the action is equally clear-cut. As the First
Circuit succinctly noted in a recent case involving stolen paintings,
"[t]o [prevail] . . . the government must prove . . . that (1) the
property was stolen; (2) after the property was stolen, it crossed a
United States boundary;64 (3) the defendant possessed . . . the
property; (4) the defendant knew the property was stolen; and (5)
the property was worth $5,000 or more."65
Taking the claimants' alleged facts as true, what is the analysis
of these elements here? Possession, value, and transport across
boundaries are easily demonstrated. Taylor possessed66 the van
Gogh in California after her acquisition of it in London in 1963;
for purposes here, I assume the painting had a value in excess of
$5,000 in Berlin in 1939;6' and, clearly, the painting crossed U.S.
and state boundaries to get from London to Los Angeles. The
62. 18 U.S.C. § 981(f) (2006) ("All right, title, and interest in property
described in subsection (a) of this section shall vest in the United States upon
commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section.")
63. 18 U.S.C. § 981(e)(6).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 2315 requires the property to have "crossed a State or
United States boundary after being stolen . . . ... 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (2006)
(emphasis added).
65. United States v. Mardirosian, 602 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing
United States v. Tashjian, 660 F.2d 829, 839 (1st Cir. 1981) (affirming
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2315 for possession of paintings the defendant
knew to be stolen despite defendant's assertion that he subjectively believed he
had good title to the paintings).
66. No case defines "possession" for purposes of the NSPA. However, in
a case involving unlawful possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922, the
Seventh Circuit defined the term as follows: "[p]ossession of an object is the
ability to control it. Possession may exist even when a person is not in physical
contact with the object, but knowingly has the power and intention to exercise
direction or control over it, either directly or through others." United States v.
Hernandez, 39 F. App'x 365, 370-71 (7th Cir. 2002).
67. This assumption seems reasonable but not beyond doubt. The NSPA
defines value to mean "the face, par, or market value, whichever is the greatest."
18 U.S.C. § 2311 (2006). Market value is determined by reference to the time
and place of the wrongful taking. See United States v. Cummings, 798 F.2d
413, 416 (10th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).
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more difficult questions are whether the van Gogh was, and
whether Taylor knew it to be, stolen.
For purposes of applying the NSPA, the Southern District of
New York recently observed:
Under [precedent in the Fifth, Second, and Eleventh
Circuits], federal law controls the question of
whether an item is stolen, and local law . .. controls
the analytically prior issues of (a) whether any
person or entity has a property interest in the item
such that it can be stolen, and (b) whether the
receiver of the item has a property interest [in] it."
Federal courts have given exceptionally broad scope to the term
"stolen" in NSPA cases. The Supreme Court set the bar in a case
involving the predecessor statute to the NSPA (the National Motor
Vehicle Act), holding that "'[s]tolen' as used in [the statute]
includes all felonious takings . . . with intent to deprive the owner
of the rights and benefits of ownership, regardless of whether or
not the theft constitutes common-law larceny."69 In a recent case
involving Holocaust art, the court observed:
While the NSPA does not define "stolen," the Court of Appeals
has held that the term should be broadly construed to encompass
"'all felonious takings ... with intent to deprive the owner of the
rights and benefits of ownership, regardless of whether or not the
theft constitutes common-law larceny."' Its meaning does not
depend on "the archaic distinctions between larceny by trespass,
larceny by trick, embezzlement and obtaining properly by false
68. Portrait of Wally, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 292, amended by No. 99 Civ.
9940(MBM), 2000 WL 1890403 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2000), disapproved on
other grounds by No. 99 Civ. 9940(MBM), 2002 WL 553532 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
12, 2002).
69. United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 417 (1957) (resolving a split in
the circuit courts on the definition of "stolen" in the National Motor Vehicle
Theft Act). In a case involving the NSPA, the Second Circuit observed: "[w]e
regard [the Court's definition of 'stolen' in] Turley as controlling here [in an
NSPA case] because the word 'stolen' is used in the same way in both the
NSPA and the NMVTA." United States v. Long Cove Seafood, Inc., 582 F.2d
159, 163 (2d Cir. 1978).
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pretenses." Rather, determination of whether property is "stolen"
in the NSPA context depends on "whether there has been some
sort of interference with a property interest." An item is stolen if it
"belonged to someone who did not . . . consent" to its being
taken.70
How do these precedents apply? The core of the claimants'
allegations was that the van Gogh left the family's possession as
the result of a "coerced sale," that is, without voluntary consent."
The van Gogh catalogues raisonn6s of 1928 and 1939 establish
Mauthner's "property interest" in the painting.7 2 A coerced sale
would clearly constitute a sale without voluntary consent, that is,
"some sort of interference with a property right."" Thus, the
allegations, if proven, would establish that the painting was
"stolen" within the meaning of the NSPA.
The question, then, is whether the painting ever ceased to be
stolen. The court in United States v. Portrait of Wally addressed
how that question should be answered:
70. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 252 (quoting Long Cove, 582
F.2d at 163; United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 399 (2d Cir.2003)).
71. See Orkin v. Taylor, 487 F.3d 734, 737 (9th Cir. 2007) ("Notably, the
[claimants] do not contend that the painting was confiscated by the Nazis.
Rather, they allege economic coercion, contending that Mauthner sold the
painting 'under duress."'). Nazi spoliation ranged from outright confiscation to
coerced sales. The first case in a United States court to recover Holocaust art
involved a work taken from the plaintiffs' home and for which the Nazi agents
issued a receipt. See Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 806 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
Claims involving coerced sales, for which extant records are unlikely, are
necessarily more complex. And even with documentation of a sale,
circumstances of coercion are unlikely to be evidenced in the sales documents.
As one commentator noted, "Although it is clear that claims based on
confiscation are limited to theft, looting, and forcible physical possession . .. it
is unclear just how far the concept of coercion extends in this unique context."
Adler, supra note 25, at 57-58.
72. See Complaint, supra note 29, 118.
73. See supra quoted paragraph accompanying note 71. 1 am unaware of
a case addressing the specific question whether a coerced sale transforms the
sold goods into "stolen" goods for purposes of the NSPA. Given federal courts'
broad reading of the term "stolen" in NSPA cases, however, it is reasonable to
conclude that a court would find a coerced sale a sufficient "interference with a
property right" to have that effect.
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Under the common law, "one cannot be convicted of receiving
stolen goods if, before the stolen goods reached the receiver, the
goods had been recovered by their owner or his agent, including
the police." This doctrine . . . is well-established federal law;
federal courts routinely apply it in cases involving federal statutes
that prohibit the receipt or transportation of stolen goods without
inquiring into whether the doctrine is part of the relevant body of
local law, as they would have to do if local law controlled this
issue.7 4
The reciprocal conclusion is implicit: Until a stolen work is
returned to the owner from whom it had been wrongfully taken (or
to the owner's agent), it remains stolen for NSPA purposes.
Accordingly, assuming the allegations to be true and provable, the
van Gogh remains stolen.
The next question is whether Taylor had the requisite knowledge
to satisfy the NSPA's scienter requirement. The government's
burden is to prove only that a possessor "knows" the property is
74. Portrait of Wally, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 290 (quoting United States v.
Muzii, 676 F.2d 919, 923 (2d Cir. 1982)). The Wally court refers only to
"receipt or transportation" of stolen goods. Id. The doctrine was applied to a
case of possession in United States v. Mardirosian, 602 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.
2010). There also is precedent applying the doctrine to possession cases under
other federal statutes. See United States v. Monasterski, 567 F.2d 677 (6th Cir.
1977) (holding, in a case involving an alleged possession crime under 18 U.S.C.
§ 659, that the defendant could not be convicted of receiving stolen goods when
actual physical possession of such goods had been recovered by the owner's
agent for delivery to the intended receiver). The Monasterski court provides a
history of the doctrine, beginning with two 19th century English cases, and a
careful summary of prior federal case law. See id. at 679-82. The court
observes:
All would agree that at some point in time the goods in this
case ceased being stolen goods. We must decide at what point
thee goods lost that status in contemplation of the law. We
feel the best an only workable rule is the common law rule viz,
the goods lost their stolen character immediately upon being
recovered by the owner or his agent.
Id. at 681. For a discussion of the Wally court's handling of this issue, see
Susan E. Brabenec, The Art ofDetermining "Stolen Property:" United States v.
Portrait of Wally, A Painting by Egon Schiele, 69 U. CIN. L. REv. 1369 (2001).
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"stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken." " That is, the
government must demonstrate that the defendant has "factual
knowledge [that the good is stolen] as distinguished from
knowledge of the law."" Knowledge that property was stolen
"'may be inferred from circumstances that would convince a man
of ordinary intelligence that this is the fact."'" Moreover, after-
acquired knowledge meets the scienter requirement, even if the
government is the source of that information" and even if the
period between acquisition of the goods and acquisition of
knowledge that they are stolen is many years.79 The government
75. 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (2006). The NSPA's scienter requirement is
limited to the status of property as having been stolen; the U.S. need not prove
the possessor's knowledge of the NSPA's other elements-for example, that the
possessor knows the property crossed a state or U.S. boundary (notwithstanding
that the government must prove those other elements). See, e.g., United States
v. Rosa, 17 F.3d 1531, 1544 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Tannuzzo, 174
F.2d 177, 180 (2d Cir. 1949). Further, 18 U.S.C. § 2315, the section of the
NSPA criminalizing possession of stolen goods, requires no proof of unlawful
or fraudulent intent, meaning that no inquiry into the possessor's state of mind is
required. See Gendron v. United States, 295 F.2d 897, 901 (8th Cir. 1961)
(holding that 18 U.S.C. § 2315 contains no specific requirement of unlawful or
fraudulent intent and reasoning that Congress deliberately omitted this intent
requirement given that it included such a requirement in the parallel provision of
the NSPA codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2314).
76. United States v. Howard, 214 F.3d 361, 363 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting
Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 192-93 n.14 (1998)) (discussing the
knowledge requirement with respect to possession of a stolen firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j)).
77. Corey v. United States, 305 F.2d 232, 238 (9th Cir. 1962) (quoting
Melson v. United States, 207 F.2d 558, 559 (4th Cir. 1953)).
78. For example, in United States v. Simon, 225 F.2d 260, 261 (3d Cir.
1955), the court quoted that:
There was evidence . . . that appellant acquired knowledge
that the turkeys had been stolen after he had received them;
for example, that such knowledge was acquired by means of
or as a result of appellant's interviews . . . with two separate
teams of F.B.I. agents who questioned him about stolen
"Lynbrook" turkeys ....
For an example of how CAFRA's innocent owner defense intersects with the
NSPA scienter requirement, see supra note 62.
79. In a contract dispute that turned on whether the property was stolen
within the meaning of the NSPA, the court held that knowledge that a
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may demonstrate scienter by proving that a defendant with reason
to suspect a theft acted with deliberate ignorance or conscious
avoidance to prevent discovering that the property is stolen."o
Under the alleged facts, there are three occasions when "a
person of ordinary intelligence" might have learned the van Gogh
was stolen. The first is at the time of public auction in 1963; the
second, when Taylor attempted to sell the work in 1990; and the
third, when the claimants demanded return of the painting in 2003
and filed a complaint for its return in 2004.
As to the first, the question is whether incorrect information and
errors in the work's provenance published in the 1963 Sotheby's
sales catalogue sufficed to alert a person of ordinary intelligence
that the work was stolen."' For at least two reasons, the answer to
that question is likely no. First, as discussed above, the art market
in the decades following the war paid scant attention to the recent
history of Nazi looting: There appears to be no evidence of
heightened scrutiny of works whose provenance indicated German
ownership during the Third Reich. Even had the errors been
noticed, there is nothing to suggest that collectors would have
interpreted them as evidence of Nazi looting. Second, standards
for diligence in the acquisition of art were not what they are today:
The first scholarly article on the topic appeared only in 1990.82
seventeenth-century Benin bronze statue acquired more than ten years after the
plaintiff acquired the object satisfied the scienter requirement. Hartman v.
Harris, 810 F. Supp. 82, 83, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). Because the other elements of
18 U.S.C. § 2314 were met, the court found that a contract regarding the statue
was illegal, and thus void and unenforceable. Id. at 85. Further bolstering the
court's conclusion that the plaintiff knew the statue was stolen was that an art
dealer told the plaintiff it was stolen some years after the plaintiff had acquired
it, and the plaintiff had "taken [the art dealer's] word." Id. at 83.
80. See United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 412, 414 (2d Cir. 2003)
(upholding a conscious avoidance jury instruction in an NSPA case involving
stolen antiquities). In the words of the Wally court: "[t]he Painting is also
subject to forfeiture if [the transporter of the painting] was aware of a high
probability that [the painting] was stolen and deliberately looked the other way."
Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 269.
81. See Complaint, supra note 29, IT 17-25.
82. See Linda F. Pinkerton, Due Diligence in Fine Art Transactions, 22
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1 (1990). The first symposium on provenance and due
diligence standards was held only in 2000: the April 2000 Conference on
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The art market of the 1960s simply did not work on the basis of
diligence; it worked on understandings." Accordingly, it is
difficult to see a court determining that in 1963 Taylor had
knowledge, or sufficient information to warrant diligent
investigation, of a link between the work and Nazi looting.
In 1990, when Taylor offered the van Gogh for sale at auction in
London, Christie's sales catalogue corrected errors in the work's
provenance that appeared in the 1963 Sotheby's catalogue.84
Whether those corrections constitute sufficient circumstances to
"convince a person of ordinary intelligence" that the work was
stolen or justify a conscious avoidance instruction is unclear and
probably doubtful. Although Taylor had had twenty-seven years to
investigate the work's history, no claim for the painting had been
asserted during those three decades despite the notoriety of
Taylor's ownership of it." Moreover, as discussed above, the
Provenance and Due Diligence sponsored by the International Foundation for
Art Research in collaboration with New York University. See Provenance &
Due Diligence, INT'L FOUND. ON ART RES. (April 29, 2000),
http://www.ifar.org/past event.php?docid= 1192514072.
83. As late as 1978, a New York court observed about the New York art
market:
We have just completed a journey through the fantasy land of
marketing in the fine arts. Prestigious names have been
dropped freely as rain. Large sums of money or negotiable
paper have changed hands suddenly. Valuable objets d'art
have moved internationally with comparable swiftness. . . .
The relevant core of testimony is that in an industry whose
transaction cry out for verification of both title to and
authenticity of subject matter, it is deemed poor practice to
probe into either.
Porter v. Wertz, 23 UCC Rep. Serv. 614, 1978 WL 23505 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar.
13, 1978).
84. Complaint, supra note 29, 11 29-30.
85. For the acquisition in 1963, see Sotheby's Sells Wolf Collection, N.Y.
TIMES, April 25, 1963, at 30: "The highest price [for a work in the Wolf
Collection] was paid by Francis Taylor, bidding for his daughter, Elizabeth
Taylor, the actress. He paid E92,000 for a landscape painted by Vincent van
Gogh in 1889, entitled 'Vue de l'Asile et de la Chapelle de Saint-Remy."' For
the sale in 1990, see Taylor Selling van Gogh, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1990, at
C13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1990/11/05/arts/taylor-selling-van-
gogh.html?scp=1&sq=Taylor%20Selling%20van%2OGogh&st=cse.
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sensibility to Holocaust art issues was still, in 1990, undeveloped.
Thus, it is again hard to conclude that the United States could
prove scienter in 1990.
Finally, in December 2003, the claimants made a demand on
Taylor for return of the van Gogh following which there were
failed negotiations; in 2004, the parties filed suit.86 The claimants'
demand and subsequent filing of a complaint in court would not by
themselves prove that Taylor had either actual knowledge or an
obligation to investigate the allegations to obviate a later assertion
of conscious avoidance of the truth. However, if the United States
had demonstrated probable cause to a magistrate that the work was
stolen and then fully informed Taylor of the evidence it had
regarding the work's provenance, it would be hard to conclude that
Taylor did not then learn-did not "know"-that the work was
stolen or, in the absence of a diligent effort to make an
independent determination, that Taylor did not consciously avoid
learning the truth."
Accordingly, there would have been no impediment to the
United States' prevailing in a civil forfeiture action against the van
Gogh. All elements of an indictable act under the NSPA are
present and the action would not be time-barred. If the
government prevailed, title to the painting would, as a matter of
law, transfer to the United States, which would then have the
option of transferring its title to the claimants, thereby
accomplishing restitution and achieving, in this instance, long-
standing United States public policy."
B. United States v. One van Gogh Painting Following Adler
The more difficult question is whether Taylor's having prevailed
in the civil action immunizes the van Gogh from a subsequent
federal civil forfeiture action. That question has two components:
First, did Taylor's successful assertion of a statute of limitations
86. Complaint, supra note 29, ff 36-37; see supra text accompanying
note 36 (noting that Taylor initially filed a complaint for declaratory relief to
establish title to the van Gogh).
87. See supra text accompanying note 78.
88. See discussion infra Part VIA.
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defense vest her with good title to the van Gogh? Second, even if
the answer is yes, does the van Gogh nevertheless remain "stolen"
for purposes of the NSPA? The answer to the first question is
uncertain under applicable (California) law; however, even if the
answer were yes-that the judgment vested good title in Taylor-
under federal law the work remains "stolen" for purposes of the
NSPA: It has not yet been returned to the Mauthner family or its
agent. Put another way, even if the effect of the California civil
action were to vest good title to the painting in Taylor, for
purposes of the NSPA it remains stolen. Accordingly, the painting
can not legally be possessed by anyone other than the claimants or
their agent: Good title under state law provides no defense for
possession of federally-defined contraband."
California courts have proved skeptical of the argument that
California law allows a possessor to acquire title to chattel by the
passage of time, and have failed to respond fully to the merits of
the claim.90 The question rose to national prominence in 1980 in a
case involving stolen paintings by Georgia O'Keeffe. There, the
New Jersey Supreme Court abolished application of adverse
possession to stolen art and instituted a discovery rule standard for
determining ownership rights as between a theft victim and a
subsequent possessor. (The discovery rule, by statute or common
law, is today the majority rule and applies in California.)
However, the New Jersey Supreme Court was unable to articulate
a rule of law supporting the assertion that expiration of a statute of
limitations under a discovery rule vests good title:
89. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (holding that
Congress' Commerce Clause authority includes the power to prohibit
possession of marijuana notwithstanding California's enactment of a state
statute permitting such possession).
90. See Soc'y of Cal. Pioneers v. Baker, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 865, 872 n.13
(Cal. Ct. Appl. 1996) (suggesting "that the doctrine of adverse possession would
not apply to personal property" (citing S.F. Credit Clearing House v. Wells, 196
Cal. 701, 707 (Cal. 1925))); see also Reukema v. Hawkins, No. B168321, 2005
WL 2090791, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2005) (unpublished) (same); cf 13
B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 123 (10th ed. 2005) (opining
that under California law one could "acquire title to personal property by
adverse possession" but recognizing that case law has "cast some doubt upon
this conclusion").
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[T]he effect of the expiration of the statute of
limitations, albeit on the theory of adverse
possession, has been not only to bar an action for
possession, but also to vest title in the possessor.
There is no reason to change that result although the
discovery rule has replaced adverse possession.
History, reason, and common sense support the
conclusion that the expiration of the statute of
limitations bars the remedy to recover possession
and also vests title in the possessor.9 1
Even conjoined, "history, reason, and common sense" do not
comprise a sound legal argument. Indeed, in a case involving a
museum's attempt to quiet title of allegedly stolen coins, a
California court of appeal praised New York's "demand and
refusal rule" primarily because it works in direct opposition to the
logic presented in O'Keeffe:
We note that under New York's demand rule of
accrual, the limitations period commences upon the
owner's demand for the return of the stolen
property, without regard to the owner's diligence in
locating the property. New York's demand rule of
accrual precludes a thief from, in effect, laundering
stolen property by waiting out the civil limitations
period and then fencing the goods free and clear of
the owner's lawful title. New York thus avoids the
prospect of allowing the person in possession of the
stolen property to acquire, in effect, stolen property
by expiration of the statute of limitations.92
Assuming, for the moment, that a California were to rule that
foreclosure of the theft victim's claim by the state's statute of
limitations does vest good title in the current possessor, what effect
91. O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 873-74 (N.J. 1980).
92. Naftzger v. Am. Numismatic Soc'y, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 784, 792 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1996) (citing Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d
426, 429-31 (N.Y. 1991)).
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would that ruling have on a federal action based on a violation of
the NSPA? In brief, none.
In applying the NSPA, federal law determines whether a work is
stolen and whether and when it is no longer stolen.93 Thus, even if
state law vested good title to stolen property in a party who has
successfully asserted a statute of limitations defense, a federal
court interpreting the NSPA looks to federal, not state, law to
determine whether the work remains stolen.94 As discussed above,
if the claimants' allegations were proven, the van Gogh fits well
within the definition that courts have given to "stolen" in NSPA
cases: Mauthner held an interest in the painting, and that interest
was interfered with. The painting has not been returned to the
Mauthner family or its agent, the only way property can shed the
taint of being stolen under the NSPA." Thus, until the painting is
restituted, it is, at law, property to which one may have good title
but not a right of possession. In short, it is contraband.
Justice Stevens, in his vigorous dissent in Bennis v. Michigan,9 6
articulated what is now the standard, tripartite classification of
contraband: "pure contraband; proceeds of criminal activity; and
tools of the criminal's trade."" Examples of pure contraband-
that is, "'objects the possession of which, without more,
constitutes a crime"'-include "adulterated food, sawed-off
shotguns, narcotics, and smuggled goods."" Stevens observed that
"the government has an obvious remedial interest in removing
[pure contraband] from private circulation, however blameless or
unknowing their owners may be."99 Although Stevens omitted
93. See United States v. Portrait of Wally, 105 F. Supp.2d 288, 291-92
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), and discussion supra Part V.A.
94. See discussion supra note 75.
95. Id.
96. 516 U.S. 442, 458-62 (1996) (upholding the forfeiture of a married
couple's jointly owned car in which the husband engaged in sexual activities
with a prostitute).
97. Id. at 459 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98. Id. (quoting One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S.
693, 699 (1965)).
99. Id. The Supreme Court has upheld convictions for possession of pure
contraband in the absence of a statutory scienter requirement. See United States
v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607 (1971) (unregistered firearms); United States v.
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reference to the statutory authorities that transform chattel into
"pure contraband," those statutes are easily found; some refer
explicitly to the identified goods as "contraband" and others
simply criminalize possession of them.o In 1986, Congress added
a new item to the list of contraband property: stolen goods as
defined in the NSPA.i0
Accordingly, it is well within a reasonable interpretation of the
NSPA and precedent to conclude that the United States could
prevail in a civil forfeiture action against the van Gogh even after
Adler. Congress may not have intended that result when it
criminalized possession of stolen goods and eliminated the defense
that goods were no longer in interstate commerce. Indeed, the
result could strike a reasonable person as being more than
unreasonable. But the jurisprudence that has arisen under the
NSPA's long history and the 1986 amendments to the statute,
compel this conclusion: The United States has clear statutory
authority to achieve restitution of the van Gogh.
Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254 (1922) (narcotics). In a case where a contraband
statute included an explicit scienter requirement, the Sixth Circuit narrowly
construed the requirement as mandating only that the defendant know he
possessed goods that matched the statutory criteria of "contraband." See United
States v. Elshenawy, 801 F.2d 856, 859 (6th Cir. 1986) (cigarettes).
100. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2341(2) (2006) (cigarettes without tax
stamps); 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (2006) (unregistered firearms); 49 U.S.C. §
80302(a)(1) (2006) (narcotics). In both of those statutes the term "contraband"
is used explicitly. However, other federal law prohibits possession of statutorily
defined property without explicitly defining it as "contraband." See, e.g.,
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(D) (2006) (making it
"unlawful for any person ... [to] possess, sell, deliver, carry, transport, or ship
[endangered species taken in violation of other provisions of the Act]"); cf 18
U.S.C. § 545 (2006) (criminalizing, inter alia, the knowing receipt, concealment,
buying, or selling of merchandise imported or brought into the United States
"contrary to law" and instructing that "[p]roof of defendant's possession of such
goods, unless explained to the satisfaction of the jury, shall be deemed evidence
sufficient to authorize conviction for violation of this section").
101. Although the van Gogh fits within Justice Stevens' first category, it
falls also within the second: "The second category-proceeds [of criminal
activity]-traditionally covered only stolen property, whose return to its original
owner has a powerful restitutionary justification." Bennis, 516 U.S. at 459
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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VI. THE EQUITIES: APPLYING UNITED STATES LAW TO
ACCOMPLISH UNITED STATES POLICY
The NSPA's purposes and language fully support the United
States' active use of civil forfeiture proceedings based on NSPA
violations to achieve restitution of Holocaust art. The question
remains whether the United States should bring such forfeiture
actions. On the one hand, for more than 60 years it has been
explicit executive branch policy to support restitution efforts,'o2
which would argue for an affirmative answer. On the other,
applying a federal statute that effectively eliminates a statute-of-
limitations defense conflicts with strong, historic policy rationales
for legislative enactment and judicial enforcement of statutes of
limitation: avoiding stale lawsuits and prompting those with claims
to come forward expeditiously.' 3 Those policies argue for a
negative answer. Moreover, the legislative history of Congress's
1986 amendments to the NSPA, indicates no awareness of the
potential difficulties and unanticipated outcomes of applying a
general theft statute to works of art, which differ significantly from
other kinds of "goods."
A. Arguments that the United States should apply the NSPA
Application of an existing federal statute to accomplish clearly-
articulated policy goals is entirely appropriate, even if the
interpretation of the statute is novel and untested." Although the
102. For a succinct summary of executive branch policy from the war to
present, see Kreder, supra note 22, at 257-60, who concludes: "From wartime
declarations to recent seizures, executive policy in the United States has been to
examine the merits of each case and, wherever possible, return looted art to its
rightful owner or country." Id. at 260.
103. See generally Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The Puzzling
Purposes of Statutes of Limitation, 28 PAC. L.J. 453 (1997). For an analysis of
the role of statutes of limitations in cases seeking reparations (rather than
restitution), see Suzette M. Malveaux, Statutes ofLimitations: A Policy Analysis
in the Context of Reparations Litigation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68 (2005).
104. Although the government has not applied the amended NSPA as
described in this paper, it has brought two cases involving stolen art that would
not have been feasible prior to the 1986 amendments. See United States v.
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United States has not yet pursued the approach propounded here-
that mere possession of Holocaust art provides grounds for civil
forfeiture proceedings no matter how long the possession, is no
argument for the government not to do so. To the contrary, were
the United States not to implement its policy goals when it has
statutory means to accomplish them, would require explanation-
or revision of the government's policies. Recent executive branch
activity, however, has reinforced the country's historic policies
and efforts favoring of Nazi-looted art.
Since 1943, when President Roosevelt established a special unit
of the armed forces to protect works of art in the European
theater,' executive policy has consistently supported efforts to
preserve and to restitute works of art and other cultural property
displaced during the war. Following renewed attention to
Holocaust art matters in the 1990s,o' the executiveo' has played an
active, highly visible role in international efforts to promote
restitution.o' For example, in Washington in 1998, the
Mardirosian, 602 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2010) (affirming a conviction for possession
of stolen paintings under 18 U.S.C. § 2315); United States v. Trupin, 117 F.3d
678, 680 (2d Cir. 1997) (affirming a conviction for possession of a stolen
painting under 18 U.S.C. § 2315).
105. For a description of the founding of what would come to be known
as the "MFA&A" (Monuments Fine Arts & Architecture ) unit, see NICHOLAS,
supra note 17, at 203-27.
106. See discussion supra Part 11.
107. The legislative branch has acted to indicate clearly its sympathy
with efforts to promote the restitution of Holocaust assets. For a summary of
legislation and resolutions, see International List of Current Activities
Regarding Holocaust-Era Assets, Including Historical Commissions, and
Forced and Slave Labor, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM,
http://www.ushmm.org/assets/ (follow "List, By Country, of Governmental
Attempts . hyperlink, and then follow instructions) (last visited Nov. 19,
2011).
108. For examples of policy documents, see Terezin Declaration on
Holocaust Era Assets and Related Issues, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (June 30, 2009),
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/126162.htm [hereinafter Terezin Declaration];
Vilnius Forum Declaration, LOOTEDART.COM (Oct. 5, 2000),
http://www.lootedart.com/MFV7EE39608 [hereinafter Vilnius Declaration];
Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE (Dec. 3, 1998), http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rt/hlcst/122038.htm
[hereinafter Washington Principles].
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Department of State cosponsored the first international conference
to address these issues. At the conclusion of that meeting,
approximately forty governments promulgated the Washington
Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art, which emphasized
the importance of identifying Holocaust art and assisting those
seeking their looted property. Principle eight (of eleven)
recommends that "steps should be taken expeditiously to achieve a
just and fair solution" when a match between claimant and
property occurs. 109 Two years later the United States participated
in the Vilnius International Forum, and joined approximately forty
governments in signing the Vilnius Forum Declaration, whose first
principle states:
The Vilnius Forum asks all governments to undertake every
reasonable effort to achieve the restitution of cultural assets looted
during the Holocaust era to the original owners or their heirs. To
this end, it encourages all participating States to take all reasonable
measures to implement the Washington Conference Principles on
Nazi-Confiscated Art as well as Resolution 1205 of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe."o
Most recently and most importantly, in 2009, the United States
joined forty-five other countries in promulgating the Terezin
Declaration, a document prepared at the Prague Holocaust Era
Assets Conference. In signing this Declaration, the United States
committed itself to a remarkable goal: assuring that the U.S. legal
109. Washington Principles, supra note 1089, 8 ("If the pre-War
owners of art that is found to have been confiscated by the Nazis and not
subsequently restituted, or their heirs, can be identified, steps should be taken
expeditiously to achieve a just and fair solution, recognizing this may vary
according to the facts and circumstances surrounding a specific case.").
110. Vilnius Declaration, supra note 108, 1. Resolution 1205 of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (November 1, 1999) is titled
"Looted Jewish Cultural Property" and states, inter alia, that "[lt]he Assembly
believes that restitution of [Nazi] looted cultural property to its original owners
or their heirs . . . is a significant way of enabling the reconstitution of the place
of Jewish culture in Europe itself." EUR. PARL. Ass. RES. 1205 8 (Nov. 5,
1999), available at http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/
AdoptedText/ta99/ERES 1205.htm.
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system makes certain that Holocaust art claims are resolved "on
the facts and merits of the claims.""'
Thus, there is no question that prior and current U.S. policy
supports-indeed, one could say, demands-the executive to apply
the NSPA as described here. That position is also supported by
sound legal arguments: Most simply, the language of the NSPA
and precedent interpreting it fully support the novel application of
the NSPA described here. Moreover, as a matter of common-law
principles, it is axiomatic that even a good-faith purchaser cannot
obtain title from or through a thief."2 Application of the NSPA in
this context allows the government to accomplish the goals of the
venerable nemo dat rule even (or, especially,) in situations in
which a private, civil litigant is time-barred. Finally, pursuing
these cases should not present difficulties for federal prosecutors.
The Department of Justice has substantial experience using
forfeiture actions predicated on NSPA violations in the context of
another form of cultural property theft. For more than thirty years,
the Department has assisted foreign nations' efforts to repatriate
antiquities from U.S. possessors."' Indeed, federal prosecutors
were on the cutting edge of the law, when, in the mid-1970s, it
111. Terezin Declaration, supra note 108 (emphasis added).
112. The doctrine nemo dat quod non habet (no one can give what one
does not have) refers to the common law principle that no one whose chain of
title derives from or through a thief has good title to the stolen property.
However, a current possessor's defenses based on passage of time, such as
statutes of limitations and laches, may prevent the theft victim from regaining
the stolen property or its value. The nemo dat rule is not a part of civil law,
which generally grants title by prescription to a bona fide purchaser after a
period of years. This "contrasting treatment of good faith purchasers in the US
and in the civil law world is an oddity, a rare example of opposing substantive
private law rules in the two major traditions of Western law." John Henry
Merryman, The Good Faith Acquisition of Stolen Art 24 (Stanford Pub. Law &
Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 1025515), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1025515&download=yes.
Merryman's article provides a thorough discussion from the perspective of a
comparativist between the common and civil law treatment of bona fide
purchasers of stolen art.
113. For a list of these cases, see Stephen K. Urice, Between Rocks and
Hard Places: Unprovenanced Antiquities and the National Stolen Property Act,
40 N. MEX. L. REV. 123, 137 n.89 (2010).
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successfully placed the NSPA at the center of U.S. efforts to
control the trade in illicit antiquities. When the Department of
Justice started to apply the NSPA in this unprecedented way, the
result was so stunning as to prompt Judge Minor Wisdom, in the
first case of its kind to reach a Circuit court,"' to open his opinion
as follows: "[m]useum directors, art dealers, and innumerable
private collectors throughout this country must have been in a state
of shock when they read the news if they did of the convictions of
the five defendants in this case.""' The U.S. has brought such
actions even in situations in which foreign nation could have
brought a civil action against the U.S. possessor and even when
such action would not have been time-barred."6 Thus the question
arises: If the United States has been willing, indeed eager, to apply
the NSPA in novel ways for one form of cultural property
(antiquities), why could it not-or, better, why has it not-been
equally innovative in applying the NSPA in Holocaust art cases?
In short it is difficult to see any reason why the United States
should not pursue the approach described in this paper. That
approach may be the only avenue available to assure that
Holocaust art claims are, in the words of the Terezin Declaration,
decided "on the facts and merits of the claims.""
114. For a discussion of why United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d
1154 (9th Cir. 1974), often cited as the first of these cases, must yield pride of
place to McClain, see Andrew L. Adler & Stephen K. Urice, Resolving the
Disjunction Between Cultural Property Policy and Law: A Call for Reform, 64
RUTGERS L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 9), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1792588.
115. United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 991 (5th Cir. 1977).
Federal prosecutors had succeeded in arguing that Mexican antiquities that
Mexico did not know to exist were nevertheless stolen for NSPA purposes when
they were illegally exported from Mexico after Mexico had nationalized all
antiquities within its borders. For a discussion of the "McClain Doctrine," see
Urice, supra note 114, at 130-31.
116. See, e.g., United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2003).
117. Terezin Declaration, supra note 109.
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B. Arguments Against Application of the NSPA
There are at least two arguments against applying the NSPA as
described in this paper. One is premised on the very nature of
cultural property; the other, on the long-standing deference to
reasonable statutes of limitations.
Although works of art are typically treated as "goods""' for
purposes of U.S. law, art's unique characteristics fit uncomfortably
into a general theft statute." 9 Generally, cultural property is non-
fungible; is not consumed; has no measurable useful life; tends to
be possessed through time; does not become obsolete through
wear, tear, or innovation; and often maintains or increases in value
through time. Cultural property moves: Virtually no work of art
remains where it was made; and for security and other reasons,
collectors frequently keep their collections out of public view.
Establishing a work's provenance is often exceedingly difficult,
making it difficult to determine whether a work has, at some time
118. The NSPA does not define "goods" in its definitional section. See
18 U.S.C. § 2311 (2006). Although no court has interpreted "goods" in a
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 2315, courts have considered the appropriate
definition under the other operative section of the NSPA, 18 U.S.C. § 2314. In
United States v. Seagraves, 265 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1959), a case involving
geophysical maps, the court developed a two-part definition: "Goods" must be
(1) personal property or chattels that (2) are ordinarily a subject of commerce.
Id. at 880 (citations omitted). The court observed: "Since the maps were shown
without doubt to be subjects of commerce, albeit of a specialized nature, they
are goods or wares or merchandise within the terms of the [NSPA]." Id.
Cultural property easily fits within the definition of goods in Seagraves.
119. The same is true for other statutes that consider works of art as if
they were widgets. For example, sales of works of art are generally governed
by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. In a case of first impression
determining whether an art dealer's offer to substitute one Picasso print for
another Picasso print previously sold to a collector and found to have an
inauthentic signature (thereby breaching the seller's express warranties under
the UCC), the court held that New York's enactment of UCC § 2-508(2),
permitting substitution of conforming goods for nonconforming goods, did not
apply to fine art prints because each print is unique. See, RALPH E. LERNER AND
JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW, 78-80 (3d ed. 2005).
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in the past, been stolen. 120 Above all, it is the characteristic of ars
longa that collides uncomfortably with Congress's having
effectively eliminated a time bar to U.S. action under the NSPA
for knowing possession of stolen goods.
Elsewhere, I have argued that for purposes of regulating traffic
in illicitly exported antiquities the NSPA is unwieldy-either too
broad or too narrow depending on how one interprets the two
circuit court decisions that addressed the issue.121 In the case of
Elizabeth Taylor's van Gogh, the NSPA appears equally unwieldy
but for other reasons: Its use defeats state statutes of limitations
even in a case in which all of the arguments favoring statutes of
limitations are present: Witnesses are dead, evidence is cold, and
memories are either weak or nonexistent. Under these
circumstances the opportunity for fraud increases and a court's
ability to determine what actually happened diminishes. In short,
the very nature of the van Gogh as an enduring work of art and the
belief that time eventually shifts the balance of equities in favor of
the status quo both argue against application of the NSPA in these
circumstances. Put another way, repose has its place in
commercial and civic life.
VII. CLOSE
As discussed above, most new claims brought by Holocaust
victims or their heirs against U.S. possessors to recover Nazi-
looted art will confront potentially insurmountable defenses based
on the passage of time. Civil forfeiture proceedings predicated on
knowing possession of stolen goods in violation of the NSPA offer
an alternative route to restitution under these circumstances.
Indeed, it may well be the only route to accomplish what the
United States, under the Washington Principles and the Terezin
Declaration, committed itself to achieving, just and fair solutions
of Holocaust art claims. The hard question remains, of course,
120. Indeed, under the broad judicial interpretation of "stolen" for
purposes of the NSPA vast amounts of cultural property have, sometime in their
history, been wrongfully taken.
121. See Urice, supra note 113, at 159.
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how to determine what a "just and fair" solution in these
exceptional circumstances?
Figure 1: Provenance of the van Gogh painting from the 1963
Sotheby's sales catalogue
12B
VINCENT VAN GOGH (1853-1890)
Vue de l'Asile et de la Chapelle de Saint-R6my
oil on canvas
17V2 x 23%in. (44.5 x 60cm.)
Painted in Saint-R6my, October 1889
PROVENANCE:
Johanna van Gogh-Bonger, Amsterdam
Paul Cassirer, Berlin, bought from the above in Feb. 1907
Margarete Mauthner, Berlin, bought from the above in May 1907, still in her
collection in 1928
Marcel Goldschmit & Co., Frankfurt
Alfred Wolf, Stuttgart and Buenos Aires; sale, Sotheby's, London, 24 April,
1963, lot 6 (illustrated in colour; bought by the present owner for £92,000)
Figure 2: Provenance of the van Gogh painting from the 1990
Christie's sales catalogue
Vincent van Gogh
6Vue de l'Asile et de la Chapelle de Saint-R6my
171/2 by 23% in.44.5 by 60 cm
Painted in the summer or autumn of 1889.
Provenance:
Mme Margarethe Mauthner, Berlin.
Paul Cassiser, Berlin.
M. Goldschmidt & Co, Berlin.
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